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PASS Project Overview  
• Project and process evolution began in mid-70’s
• Software exhibits world-class quality and reliability for life-critical operations
– Very high maturity software process (NASA HQ assessed as SEI Level 5)
– ISO 9001 registered process
– 29 + years of demonstrated flight safety and ultra-reliability
– CMMI Level 5 in 2006, 2009
• Onboard software controls all phases of Shuttle flights (manual and auto)
• Primary Avionics Software System (PASS)
– Provides automatic and fly-by-wire control of critical shuttle systems 
which executes in redundant computers
– 450,000 SLOC primarily in HAL/S
• Total lines have remained relatively constant over the multiple 
releases since STS-5
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Key Space Shuttle Flight
Page 3
8/9/2010
PASS FSW Development History
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PASS FSW Incremental Change Size
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Number Of Latent Unknown Product DRs Flown
Product DRs that existed on a flown system, but were unknown at the 
time of the flight .  Discovered up to 25 years later.
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Pre-Build Error Removal
Effects Of Inspection and Pre-Build Testing
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Post Build Error Rate (Process + Product)
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Verification Effectiveness
Process DRs / (Process + Product DRs)
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Product DR Rate
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MTBF, Flight Days Between In-Flight DRs
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MTBF, Calendar Days Between Ground DRs
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Number Of Flights To FSW Severity 1 DR In-Flight
• Risk Level of 1 in 1000 at January 2006 established during reliability research in 
the late 1980’s as a Return-To-Flight action.  Variation over time based on prior 
chart, MTBF as calendar days between all DR’s including DR’s found during 
ground verification of future releases.
• Computed Value For STS-1, 327 flights; For STS-134, 5260 flights.
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Years New 
Product 
DRs 
Introduced 
In Period
Latent, 
Unknown 
Product 
DRs At End 
of Period
Flight Days 
Over 
Period
DRs 
Occurring 
In Flight
Latent, 
Unknown 
Severity 1 
DRs
1978-1982 523 424 29 3 4
1983-1985 109 322 147 8 6
1986-1988 16 240 None No Flights No Flights
1989-1993 22 140 291 1 0
1994-1997 12 100 365 4 0
1998-2002 8 39 675 2 0
2003-2005 0 20 None No Flights No Flights
2006-2008 1 2 162 1 0
2009-2011 0 N/A 114 0 0
Summary Of Product DR By Period
 Supporting information available in more detail backup presentation.
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Years Product Error 
Rate
DRs / KSLOC
Pre-Build Error 
Detection 
Effectiveness
Verification 
Effectiveness 
(Percent Found 
By SRR)
Notes
1978-1982 0.8 (STS-1) to 1.1 Information Not 
Available
77 % to 91 % (STS-1)
1983-1985 2.8 (OI-1) to 1.1 40 % to 65 % 70 % to 80 % Very Short Cycle -
Release Every 4 Mo.
1986-1988 0.7 to 0.2 (OI-8C) Near 80 % 60 % to 70 % Return-to-flight 
Critical Changes
1989-1993 0.1 to 0.2 80 % to 90 % 80% to 90 %
1994-1997 0.1 to 0.2         
except 0.8 for OI-25
75 % to 85 % 85 % to 100 %         
except 60 % for OI-25
Isolated Process 
Escape on OI-25
1998-2002 0.1 to 0.2 85 % to 90 % 85 % to 95 %
2003-2005 CAU Canceled CAU Canceled CAU Canceled Work on CAU   
required changes, 
Later   CAU  
Canceled
2006-2008 0.0 to 0.1 80 % to 100% 95 % to 100 %
2009-2011 No OI Development No OI Development No Development Reduced Flight 
System Changes 
Only, No OI Dev.
Summary Of Quality Metrics By Period
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Years Calendar Days 
Between Any 
Product DR
Flight Days 
Between In-Flight 
DRs
Risk To Shuttle Due To 
Severity 1 FSW DR
1978-1982 6 (STS-1), 7 (STS-5) 7 (STS-1), 9 (STS-5) 1 in 327 (STS-1) to 1 in 409 (STS-5)
1983-1985 10 to 19 12 to 24 1 in 552    to    1 in 1072
1986-1988 29 at STS-26 90 at STS-26 1 in 1599    at        STS-26
1989-1993 29 to 42 90 to 131 1 in 1599    to    1 in 2335
1994-1997 42 to 54 131 to 120 1 in 2335    to    1 in 3161
1998-2002 54 to 61 120 to 140 1 in 3161    to    1 in 3491
2003-2005 75 at STS-114 235 at STS-114 1 in 4212    at      STS-114
2006-2008 75 to 88 235 to 276 1 in 4212    to   1 in 4930
2009-2011 88 to 94 276 to 294 1 in 4930    to   1 in 6260
Summary Of Modeled Reliability By Period
 Risk level of approximately 1 in 1000 at January 2006 established during 
reliability research in the late 1980’s as a Return-To-Flight action.  Variation over 
time based on MTBF as calendar days between any Product DR’s.
Page 16
8/9/2010
Historical PASS Quality Metrics
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Reliability Prediction Methods 
Used By PASS Software 
Process
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Predict Software Reliability At Release (CI)
• In the late 1980’s, the PASS FSW organization investigated reliability of the 
PASS FSW system using the “SMERFS” model.
• Two issues were identified in looking at predictions from “SMERFS’ versus 
actual data:
– The results that it produced seemed to skew the risk of a failure at the 
level of individual software release layers (individual OI’s).  Failures from 
oldest OI’s were under predicted.   Failures from recent OI’s were over 
predicted.  Totals were as expected.
– “SMERFS” model required actual failure history to predict reliability.   An 
alternate reliability model was developed to allow accurate predictions of 
reliability for a system prior to its release and hence prior to any actual 
failure history.
• Model was developed in 1990
• Model has been used on every PASS FSW release since then.  
Actuals versus predictions are presented to NASA customer semi-
annually
• Primary objective is monitor trend of changes to reliability, not predict 
absolute values
Page 19
8/9/2010
OI-30 1st Flight to Last Flight Failure Estimates
• The data presents a prediction of 
software failures to be encountered from 
the 1st OI34 flight until the last OI34 flight 
by release increment where introduced.
• The prediction was made on 7/19/10 
based on the updated manifest dates for 
STS-134 (launch 02/26/2011).  
• The expected number of failures was 
6 (any Product DR found in 
execution), an average of one failure 
every 90 calendar days. 
• Of these failures, best estimate is 
that 4 will occur on pre-OI03 
introduced changes.
• 95 % Confidence Interval is the range 
from 42 days to 977 days between 
failures (Calendar Days between Any 
Product DR found as a failure)
• There have been no failures since the 
launch of the  first flight off OI-34, a 
period of 325 days.
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Reliability Prediction Interpretation
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Operational Use
Reliability 
Based On 
Historical 
Failures
Observed 
High Severity 
Failures
Flights, Testing, 
Crew Training, 
Simulations
• Reliability determined from the number of 
failures occurring during flight, KSC 
operations, SMS crew training, and OI 
development and verification testing 
(including SAIL)
• Failures should be a function of:
– Total number of latent defects in the 
software
– Relative magnitude of execution during 
a year (OI’s in verification, special 
certification activities, number of crews 
in training, etc.)
• Improvement driven by reducing the number 
of latent defects in software while minimizing 
newly introduced defects
Typical 
Flight 
Regime
